This guy tells it like it (was) with Saturn.
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#62
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The I was a tour guide at the National Air and Space Museum, we had two of those engine-boosters on display, with a trick mirror-system, that imitated all five of them together...the display would otherwise have been too big for that room.
I don't want to get too far off-topic, but if you want to see the Saturn V main-engines at work, check out this video. But make sure your speakers are not adjusted too loudly...the noise these engines make is well into painful decibel-range.
Last edited by mmarshall; 07-24-21 at 05:12 PM.
#63
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Here is another take.
Why Saturn Was Destined to Fail
Why Saturn Was Destined to Fail
It’s doubly depressing to see Saturn make its final bow. Depressing, because it’s always hard to watch loyal employees lose their jobs. Depressing, too, because many of the brand’s newly written obituaries completely miss the real reasons behind Saturn’s demise, and the real damage the brand did to GM.
To understand why Saturn was destined to fail you must travel back to a freezing cold January day in 1985 in Warren, Michigan. It was there that GM Chairman Roger B. Smith proudly announced its first new nameplate in more than half a century. Saturn was conceived as a specific response to the growing threat from the fuel-efficient and affordable cars being launched into America from Japan. In other words, Saturn is a classic example of a fighter brand — a brand created to take on low-priced competitors. Smith admitted as much at the launch event, telling journalists: “In Saturn we have GM’s answer — the American answer — to the Japanese challenge.”
The first Saturns hit the market in 1990 and quickly achieved some of the highest repurchase rates and customer satisfaction scores in the industry. By 1996, orders actually exceeded Saturn’s production capacity, and the brand’s fighting prowess was further confirmed when dealer research revealed that 50% of these orders were from individuals who would otherwise have bought a Japanese import. Many commentators look back on this period of Saturn’s operations and wistfully recount it as evidence of the brand’s once great success.
Only one snag: like many fighter brands designed to take on low-priced competitors, Saturn was wildly unprofitable from the outset and totally unsustainable as a result. Its initial setup costs of $5 billion were soon extended as Saturn’s sub-compact prices failed to cover the huge costs of a dedicated plant with massive operating costs that produced cars that shared very few parts with other GM brands. By 2000, Saturn was losing $3,000 on every car it sold.
But an even bigger cost for GM was the time it lost building a brand it believed could fight off its Japanese rivals. The enormous strategic shifts that GM has been forced to make over the past year should really have been made back in the 1990s. If only Roger Smith had not believed that Saturn was the “key to GM’s long-term competitiveness, survival, and success as a domestic producer,” the company would have moved faster and earlier to fix its core business. The notion that another brand, rather than fewer brands, was the way forward turned out to be a colossal distraction.
Weep not for the loss of Saturn. The brand should be remembered as a failure from the start for three reasons. First, it failed to deliver on its mission to fend off the Japanese imports that now dominate the US market. Second, it managed to lose billions of dollars at a time when GM needed every penny it could muster. Third, Saturn represents perhaps the single biggest explanation for GM’s current precarious situation. Saturn’s demise did not take place on Wednesday of this week. It started on a cold morning in Michigan a quarter century ago with the launch of a business model fatally flawed.
To understand why Saturn was destined to fail you must travel back to a freezing cold January day in 1985 in Warren, Michigan. It was there that GM Chairman Roger B. Smith proudly announced its first new nameplate in more than half a century. Saturn was conceived as a specific response to the growing threat from the fuel-efficient and affordable cars being launched into America from Japan. In other words, Saturn is a classic example of a fighter brand — a brand created to take on low-priced competitors. Smith admitted as much at the launch event, telling journalists: “In Saturn we have GM’s answer — the American answer — to the Japanese challenge.”
The first Saturns hit the market in 1990 and quickly achieved some of the highest repurchase rates and customer satisfaction scores in the industry. By 1996, orders actually exceeded Saturn’s production capacity, and the brand’s fighting prowess was further confirmed when dealer research revealed that 50% of these orders were from individuals who would otherwise have bought a Japanese import. Many commentators look back on this period of Saturn’s operations and wistfully recount it as evidence of the brand’s once great success.
Only one snag: like many fighter brands designed to take on low-priced competitors, Saturn was wildly unprofitable from the outset and totally unsustainable as a result. Its initial setup costs of $5 billion were soon extended as Saturn’s sub-compact prices failed to cover the huge costs of a dedicated plant with massive operating costs that produced cars that shared very few parts with other GM brands. By 2000, Saturn was losing $3,000 on every car it sold.
But an even bigger cost for GM was the time it lost building a brand it believed could fight off its Japanese rivals. The enormous strategic shifts that GM has been forced to make over the past year should really have been made back in the 1990s. If only Roger Smith had not believed that Saturn was the “key to GM’s long-term competitiveness, survival, and success as a domestic producer,” the company would have moved faster and earlier to fix its core business. The notion that another brand, rather than fewer brands, was the way forward turned out to be a colossal distraction.
Weep not for the loss of Saturn. The brand should be remembered as a failure from the start for three reasons. First, it failed to deliver on its mission to fend off the Japanese imports that now dominate the US market. Second, it managed to lose billions of dollars at a time when GM needed every penny it could muster. Third, Saturn represents perhaps the single biggest explanation for GM’s current precarious situation. Saturn’s demise did not take place on Wednesday of this week. It started on a cold morning in Michigan a quarter century ago with the launch of a business model fatally flawed.
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#67
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A number of vehicles and vehicle-brands are (or were) named after Greek/Roman or other pagan deities. Some of them (there are many more) include all Mercurys, Dodge Aries, Ford Thunderbird, Buick Apollo, Maserati (Neptune/Trident logo), Ford Taurus (Astrology), VW Phaeton, VW Eos, VW Atlas, Nissan Titan, and Honda Odyssey (Odysseus).
Last edited by mmarshall; 07-24-21 at 08:18 PM.
#68
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I had a 2001 Saturn SL1; it was a serviceable car that was the basic transportation I needed--but I don't miss it at all; I remember my '83 Prelude much more fondly even though it was 18 years older. I literally got it because I was eligible for the GM Supplier Discount, and with that, the Sentra and Civic were significantly more money. But in no way shape or form was Saturn better. I was intending to get a 5-speed like a good little econobox deserves, but the Saturn MT was so horrible, I opted for the automatic.
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It was a pretty terrible car I agree
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Well, your opinion noted, but two things. First, most S-Series owners disagreed with you, and the cars had extremely high customer-satisfaction ratings and good reliability ratings from both Consumer Reports and JD Power. Second, Saturn prospered, and was one of the success stories of the industry, as long as they stuck with these vehicles and continued to improve them every few years with updates and redesigns. Like it or not (and, granted, a lot of people didn't)...the company started downhill after they replaced the S-series with the miserable Ion. After that (and the poorly-built mid-size L-series) were introduced, then there was some truth to your statement about Saturn being inferior....although the excellent Malibu-based Aura, even without plastic-panels or a spin-off transmission filter like the S-series had, later atoned for some of Saturn's post-2000 failings.
Last edited by mmarshall; 07-25-21 at 08:28 PM.
#73
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I can't agree with this. Sure, Pontiac and Olds were shadows of their former selves when they were killed off, but both have decades of history. Do they have a cult following like Saab? No; but I'm sure there are plenty of people that look back fondly on an Olds or Pontiac they owned during their lives. Much less so with Saturn.
#74
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Well, your opinion noted, but two things. First, most S-Series owners disagreed with you, and the cars had extremely high customer-satisfaction ratings and good reliability ratings from both Consumer Reports and JD Power. Second, Saturn prospered, and was one of the success stories of the industry, as long as they stuck with these vehicles and continued to improve them every few years with updates and redesigns. Like it or not (and, granted, a lot of people didn't)...the company started downhill after they replaced the S-series with the miserable Ion. After that (and the poorly-built mid-size L-series) were introduced, then there was some truth to your statement about Saturn being inferior....although the excellent Malibu-based Aura, even without plastic-panels or a spin-off transmission filter like the S-series had, later atoned for some of Saturn's post-2000 failings.
#75
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Well, your opinion noted, but two things. First, most S-Series owners disagreed with you, and the cars had extremely high customer-satisfaction ratings and good reliability ratings from both Consumer Reports and JD Power. Second, Saturn prospered, and was one of the success stories of the industry, as long as they stuck with these vehicles and continued to improve them every few years with updates and redesigns. Like it or not (and, granted, a lot of people didn't)...the company started downhill after they replaced the S-series with the miserable Ion. After that (and the poorly-built mid-size L-series) were introduced, then there was some truth to your statement about Saturn being inferior....although the excellent Malibu-based Aura, even without plastic-panels or a spin-off transmission filter like the S-series had, later atoned for some of Saturn's post-2000 failings.
The car was not a good car. At that mileage it was already making horrible noises over any speed bumps. It sounded like the suspension was going to give out. The 3.6L engine in that car was no faster than the 3.2 I had in my Acura at the time. It was a slug for how big it was and it was definitely not good on gas either. In fact if you look up that engine it's known for failing as well. His never did (at least when we still talked, no idea now).
The interior was also pretty basic. All they did was take a Malibu and change a few color tones. I remember not liking how it felt material wise and definitely didn't like the design.
IMO there's a reason you never see any on the road anymore.